Model Man: The Ciceronian *prudens* and Aristotelian φρόνησις

**1) ad Q. fr. 2.12**: scribebam illa quae dixeram πολιτικά, spissum sane opus et operosum; sed si ex sententia successerit, bene erit opera posita, sin minus, in illud ipsum mare deiciemus quod spectantes scribimus, adgrediemur alia, quoniam quiescere non possumus.

I was writing those things which I had labeled “political,” certainly a thick and laborious work; but if turns out as I intend, it will have been a work well situated, and if not, I will toss it into that very sea which I am looking at while writing, and I will move on to other things, since I can’t rest.

**2) ad Q. fr. 1.1.29**: atque ille quidem princeps ingeni et doctrinae Plato tum denique fore beatas res publicas putavit, si aut docti et sapientes homines eas regere coepissent aut ii qui regerent omne suum studium in doctrina et sapientia conlocassent hanc coniunctionem videlicet potestatis et sapientiae saluti censuit civitatibus esse posse. quod fortasse aliquando universae rei publicae nostrae.

And indeed Plato, that leader of character and learning, thought that states would be blessed then at last, if either the learned and wise men began to rule them or if those who were ruling had settled all their zeal in learning and wisdom, clearly this joining of power and wisdom he judged would be able to serve as salvation for states. This perhaps at one time was the case of our whole republic.

**3) Resp. 473cd**: ἐὰν μή … ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλῆς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέσῃ, δύναμίς τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, … οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα, … ταῖς πόλεσι

Unless either philosophers rule in cities or if those who are now called kings and rulers philosophize both legitimately and sufficiently, and this happens at the same time, both political power and philosophy, there will be no rest from evils for states.

**4) DRP 2.21**: Nam princeps ille, quo nemo in scribendo praestantior fuit, aream sibi sumsit, in qua civitatem extrueret arbitratu suo, praeclaram ille quidem fortasse, sed a vita hominum abhorrentem et moribus.

For that leader, than whom no one has been more outstanding in writing, took up an area for himself, on which he would build up a state from his own thinking; perhaps indeed that man made an outstanding one, but one unfit for the life and customs of humans.

**5) DRP 2.57**: Sed id quod fieri natura rerum ipsa cogebat, ut plusculum sibi iuris populus adscisceret liberatus a regibus … in quo defuit fortasse ratio, sed tamen vincit ipsa rerum publicarum natura saepe rationem. id enim tenetote quod initio dixi, nisi aequabilis haec in civitate conpensatio sit et iuris et officii et muneris, ut et potestatis satis in magistratibus et auctoritatis in principum consilio et libertatis in populo sit, non posse hunc incommutabilem rei publicae conservari statum

But this is what the very nature of matters forced to happen, that the people freed from the kings would adopt for themselves somewhat more rights… In this perhaps reason was lacking, but nevertheless often the nature of states itself overcomes reason. For hold on to this which I said in the beginning, that unless there should be this fair balancing in the state of rights and duty and service, so that there is enough power in the magistrates and authority in the plan of the leaders and freedom in the people, this state of the republic cannot be maintained unchanged.

**6) DRP 2.51**: sit huic oppositus alter, bonus et sapiens et peritus utilitatis dignitatisque civilis, quasi tutor et procurator rei publicae; sic enim appelletur quicumque erit rector et gubernator civitatis.

Let another be set opposite to this one, good and wise and experienced in the greater good and dignity of the state, just like a guardian and manager of the state; for thus may he whoever he will be, be called the guide and helmsman of the state.

**7) DRP 2.67**: sed tamen est ille prudens, qui, ut saepe in Africa vidimus, immani et vastae insidens beluae, coercet et regit [beluam] quocumque volt et levi admonitu aut tactu inflectit illam feram… ergo ille Indus aut Poenus unam coercet beluam, et eam docilem et humanis moribus adsuetam; at vero ea quae latet in animis hominum quaeque pars animi mens vocatur, non unam aut facilem ad subigendum frenat et domat <beluam>, si quando id efficit, quod perraro potest.

But that man is the man of practical wisdom, who, as we often saw in Africa, seated on an immense and huge beast, he checks and guides it wherever he wants, and with a mild warning or touch he turns that animal…Therefore that Indian or Carthaginian checks one beast, both itself tame and accustomed to human ways; but those things which hide in the souls of men and what part of the soul is called the mind, one does not rein in or tame one thing only or one easy to subjugate, if at anytime he accomplishes this, which he is very exceptional to do.

**8) DRP 2.69**: ut numquam a se ipso intuendo contemplandoque discedat, ut ad imitationem sui vocet alios, ut sese splendore animi et vitae suae sicut speculum praebeat civibus.

That he never cease from observing his own self and contemplating, that he calls others to imitate him, that he offer himself to the citizens just like a reflection with the splendor of his mind and his life.

**9) NE 1180b-1181a**: τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἵ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ: οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται.

Regarding political matters, the sophists announce that they teach them, but none of them do them, and those in government, they may seem to do this with some faculty and experience rather than understanding: for they clearly neither write nor speak about such matters.

**10) DRP 1.11-12**: maximeque hoc in hominum doctorum oratione mihi mirum videri solet, quod qui tranquillo mari gubernare se negent posse, quod nec didicerint nec umquam scire curaverint, iidem ad gubernacula se accessuros profiteantur excitatis maximis fluctibus… Haec pluribus a me verbis dicta sunt ob eam causam, quod his libris erat instituta et suscepta mihi de re publica disputatio; quae ne frustra haberetur, dubitationem ad rem publicam adeundi in primis debui tollere. ac tamen si qui sunt qui philosophorum auctoritate moveantur, dent operam parumper atque audiant eos quorum summa est auctoritas apud doctissimos homines et gloria

And this usually seems especially miraculous to me in the speech of learned men, that they who deny that they could be captain on a tranquil sea, since they neither learned nor ever took care to know, these same ones profess that they will approach the helm when the greatest waves have been driven up… These things have been said by me in very many words for this reason, that with these books a philosophical discussion (disputatio) about the State had been established and undertaken by me; and I especially ought to remove the doubt, so that it not be held in vain, of approaching the State. And even if there are some who would be moved by the authority of philosophers, may they give this work a little while and hear those whose authority and glory is greatest among the most learned people.

**11) NE 1106b**: ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν

Virtue is a disposition concerning choice, which is in the mean in relation to us, and determined by reason with which the man of practical wisdom would determine”

**12) NE 1103a-b:** τὰς δ᾽ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν: ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν... μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν: οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἁμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης.

And we get the virtues exercising them earlier, just as also in the other skills; for the things which it is necessary to do having learned them, we learn by doing these things... And what happens in cities bears witness to this: for the lawgivers accustoming their citizens make them good, and this is the purpose of every lawgiver, as many as err by not doing this well, and by this a good state differs from a bad state.

**13) De Or. 1.53-7**: Quae nisi qui naturas hominum vimque omnem humanitatis causasque eas, quibus mentes aut incitantur aut reflectuntur, penitus perspexerit, dicendo quod volet perficere non poterit. Atque totus hic locus philosophorum proprius videtur, neque orator me auctore umquam repugnabit... illud tamen oratori tribuam et dabo, ut eadem, de quibus illi tenui quodam exsanguique sermone disputant, hic cum omni iucunditate et gravitate explicet.

He will not be able to accomplish what he wants by speaking, unless he has thoroughly reflected on people’s natures and every power of humanity and their causes, by which minds are incited or turned. And this seems nearly the whole area of the philosophers, and no orator by my authority will ever fight against that… nevertheless I will allot and give that to the orator, that this man explain with all charm and seriousness the same things about which those guys argue about with a certain weak and bloodless conversation.

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