

Representative Democracy in Late Classical Greece

- 1. James Madison, *Federalist* 63:** “There are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next.”
- 2. James Madison, *Federalist* 10:** “The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest...”
- 3. Isocrates 7 (*Areopagiticus*) 22:** ὥκουν τὴν πόλιν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων τὰς ἀρχὰς κληροῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ τοὺς ἰκανωτάτους ἐφ’ ἕκαστον τῶν ἔργων προκρίνοντες. τοιοῦτους γὰρ ἤλπιζον ἔσεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ οἱ περ ἂν ὥσιν οἱ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστατοῦντες.
“They [those who ruled in the days of Solon and Cleisthenes] governed the city, not by filling magistracies by lottery from all citizens, but a preliminary selection of the most able to perform the various duties of state. For they hoped that the other citizens would become similar to those who ran things.”
- 4. Xenophon, *Spartan Society* 10.3:** ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς γερωντίας ἀγῶν ψυχῶν ἀγαθῶν κρίσιν παρέχει.
“The contest for membership on the Gerousia is a judgment of the quality of souls.”
- 5. Xenophon, *Education of Cyrus* 1.6.22:** λέγεις σύ, ὦ πάτερ, εἰς τὸ πειθομένους ἔχειν οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀνυσιμώτερον τοῦ φρονιμώτερον δοκεῖν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχομένων. λέγω γὰρ οὔν, ἔφη. καὶ πῶς δὴ τις ἂν, ὦ πάτερ, τοιαύτην δόξαν τάχιστα περὶ αὐτοῦ παρασχέσθαι δύναιτο; οὐκ ἔστιν ἔφη, ὦ παῖ, συντομωτέρα ὁδὸς [...] τὸ γενέσθαι περὶ τούτων φρόνιμον.
“[Cyrus said,] ‘Are you saying, father, that there is nothing more effective for keeping one’s followers obedient than seeming to be wiser than those who are being ruled?’ ‘Yes,’ he said. ‘And how, father,’ said Cyrus, ‘could one produce such a reputation about oneself most quickly?’ ‘There is no easier path [...] than actually being wiser.’”
- 6. Aristotle, *Politics* 4.6:** δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μάλιστα τὸ τὰς τιμὰς νενεμησθαι κατ’ ἀρετήν.
“Aristocracy seems to consist chiefly in dividing up honors according to virtue.”

7. **Plato, *Laws* 945c:** ῥάδιον μὲν οὐδαμῶς εὐρεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντα ὑπερβάλλοντα πρὸς ἀρετήν, ὅμως δὲ πειρατέον εὐθυντάς τινας ἀνευρίσκειν θείου.
- “It is not at all easy to find a magistrate who surpasses other magistrates in virtue. Nevertheless one must try to find *euthuntai* who are divine.”
8. **Xenophon, *Spartan Society* 10.3:** οὐχ ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι πόλεις ἐῷσι τοὺς αἰρεθέντας αἰεὶ ἄρχειν τὸ ἔτος ὅπως ἂν βούλωνται.
- “Unlike other cities, [the ephors] do not allow the elected officials to spend their one-year term however they want.”
9. **“Old Oligarch” 3.2:** ἔπειτα δὲ δίκας καὶ γραφὰς καὶ εὐθύνας ἐκδικάζειν ὅσας οὐδ’ οἱ σύμπαντες ἄνθρωποι ἐκδικάζουσι.
- “Then [the Assembly] conducts private and public lawsuits and accountability procedures (*euthunai*), and they do more of these than the rest of mankind put together.”
10. **Herodotus 3.80.6:** πάλω μὲν ἀρχὰς ἄρχει, ὑπεύθυνον δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βουλευμάτα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει.
- “[Democracy] appropriates magistracies by lot, holds magistracies accountable (*hupeuthynos*), and refers all deliberations to the collective.”
11. **Meiggs & Lewis 45 (440s B.C.):** το[ουτοις δὲ τὴν πορείαν ἐκάστωι συγγράψαντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀ]ποστει--λάντων· εἰ δὲ μή, καθ’ ἕνα ἕκαστον εὐθυ]νόσθωμ [μ]υρ[ίαις δραχμαῖς.
- “Let the generals draw up the travel fare for these [heralds] and send them off. If they do not, let them be held accountable and punished by a fine of 10,000 drachmas each.”
12. **IG II² 681 (276/5 B.C.):** Θυμοχά]ρη[ς] δὲ ὁ υἱὸς ὁ τούτου, πατήρ δὲ Φαίδρου χει[ροτονη]θεὶς στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικ[ὸν ἔπλε]υσεν ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν ἃς ὁ δῆμος [τῶι τῶν Μακεδόνων στόλῳι] συνέπεμπεν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν.
[...]
στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονηθεὶς ἐπὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν δις πάντων ὧμ προσῆκεν ἐπεμελήθη καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως· ν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν χειροτονηθεὶς πλεονάκις καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ξένους γενόμενος τρίς.
[...]
χειροτονηθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα στρατηγός...
- “Thumochares, the son of this man and the father of Phaedrus, was elected general for naval affairs by the people and sailed out on the ships that the people sent to Asia along with with the expedition of the Macedonians.
[...]
[Phaedrus] was elected general for procurement by the demos twice and took care of all that he was charged with well and with distinction. And he was elected general for the country many times and general for mercenaries three times.
[...]
[Phaedrus] was elected by the people general for armaments ...”

- 13. Isocrates 15 (*Antidosis*) 131:** ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὔτε μισόδημος ὢν οὔτε μισάνθρωπος οὔθ' ὑπερήφανος, οὔτ' ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἔχων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, διὰ τὴν μεγαλοφροσύνην τὴν τῆ στρατηγία μὲν συμφέρουσιν, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρείας τῶν ἀεὶ προσπιπτόντων οὐχ ἀρμόττουσαν, ἅπασιν ἔδοξεν ἔνοχος εἶναι τοῖς προειρημένους· οὕτω γὰρ ἀφυῆς ἦν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεραπείαν.
- “That great man [Timotheus] was neither a despiser of the people nor a misanthrope nor arrogant, and did he possessed no other such character flaw. Rather, because of his greatness of spirit, which is useful for generalship but unsuitable for ordinary interactions with passersby, he seemed to everyone to be guilty of the charges. He was naturally unsuited for flattery of human beings.”
- 14. IG II² 457 (307/6 B.C.):** δ]οὺς εὐθύνας πολλακίς [τῶν τε πεπολιτευμένων καὶ τῶν] διωικημέν[ων ἐν ἐλευθέραι καὶ δημοκρατουμένη τῆ] πόλει
- “And [Lycurgus] submitted *euthynai* many times for his policies and administrations in the city, which was free and democratically governed.”
- 15. Isocrates 7 (*Areopagiticus*) 26:** ἐκεῖνοι διεγνωκότες ἦσαν ὅτι δεῖ τὸν μὲν δῆμον ὥσπερ τύραννον καθιστάναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας καὶ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούμενων. [...] καίτοι πῶς ἄν τις εὔροι ταύτης βεβαιότεραν ἢ δικαιότεραν δημοκρατίαν, τῆς τοὺς μὲν δυνατωτάτους ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις καθιστάσης, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὸν δῆμον κύριον ποιούσης.
- “Those men resolved that the people ought to have the power of a tyrant to allocate the offices and punish those who do wrong and sit as jury on disputed matters. [...] And how could anyone find a more secure or more just democracy than this – one that put the most capable men in charge of affairs but made the people sovereign over them.”

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