"Honor, Fear and Profit": Non-Universal Terms in Thucydides

Daniel P. Tompkins (Temple University)

This paper will show that when Thucydides’ Athenians claim they built their empire motivated by “honor, fear and profit,” they are not expressing the supposed “universal” motives of all interstate actors in Thucydides, but rather revealing a particular national character trait that sets them off from others, especially from the Spartans.

This is important because important political philosophers and “realist” international relations scholars have built theories on the “universal” interpretation of these three nouns. Leo Strauss and his followers regularly refer to them as “compelling,” while Michael Doyle, a representative “realist,” speaks of “Thucydides’ famous trinity of security, honor, and interest.”

When reviewed with care, the “famous trinity” turns to be not compelling, but contingent and ambiguous.

“Honor,” for instance, in Thucydides becomes primarily an Athenian value, playing a major role for Pericles, Nicias and Alcibiades. Thucydidean “honor,” like Homer’s, is a zero-sum game, not a shared cooperative virtue. Remarkably, Spartans don’t play the game. A careful study of Sparta’s regard for “honor,” including Plato’s Republic 544ff., provides some explanations.

Thucydides uses not one but two words for “fear,” deos and phobos. (The cluster of words for “shock,” ekpletto and so on, does not figure here.) These overlap to some degree. deos in Thucydides can range from “dread” to “serious apprehension,” and can generally be translated as “apprehension that leads to rational decisions.” When Athenians twice say they were motivated by “apprehension,” they place themselves at a distance from the Spartans, who are moved by a different kind of fear.

Finally, “profit” or “benefit” refers only in part to Athenian rapacity. Both Thucydides scholars and political scientists need to note that the speech begins by showing, repeatedly, that not Athens but Sparta and other Greeks have benefited from Athenian behavior. Only after laying that groundwork do the speakers note their own self-interest.

Once we recognize the contingent nature of Thucydidean abstractions, it is not difficult to realize that other terms, for instance “human nature,” also require close analysis. The paper will conclude with a demonstration that “human nature” is deeply ambiguous, undermining many grand claims that have been made about it.

Bibliography

Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace. New York: Norton, 1997.

Strauss, Leo. The City and Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.