Plutarch’s Pompey:
a Roman Paper Tiger

Michael D. Nerdahl (University of North Carolina, Greensboro)

The victory of Caesar over Pompey is one of the world’s great underdog stories. Before Caesar had even reached the rank of aedile, Pompey, Sulla’s right-hand man against Carbo and Sertorius, had claimed the title of Magnus, celebrated a triumph twice, served a consulship, and acquired unprecedented powers in order to cleanse the Mediterranean of pirates. Pompey was in the best position to replace Sulla, and yet he lost control of Rome to Caesar. Modern scholars tend to credit Caesar’s victory to his undeniably unique set of talents and characteristics. To quote one example, Scullard notes, “With immense skill (Caesar) played the game of politics, using the weapons of his day to win power and pre-eminence” (H.H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, 1959, p. 159). In the Life of Caesar, Plutarch undeniably argues for such a point of view: Caesar becomes the power that conquers Rome and destroys the Republic.

Though Plutarch may credit Caesar with victory, he cannot entirely credit him with Pompey’s defeat: the great accomplishments of Caesar depend just as heavily on Pompey’s own mistakes and passivity as on Caesar’s unrelenting ambition and unequaled ability. The Life of Pompey, the longest of Plutarch’s Lives, describes Pompey’s many successes and virtues as well as his slow but inevitable fall from power that is only partly due to Caesar’s political and military skill. Appropriately, in this Life Plutarch implies that Pompey’s rise and ruin, and most importantly, his failure to win Rome, primarily hinge upon the character and decisions of Pompey, not Caesar. Plutarch explains Pompey’s defeat by consistently portraying him as a hero whose fame outstrips his achievements.

Many of Pompey’s achievements came by 61 BCE, and scholars have fixated on the direct criticism that Plutarch displays towards Pompey at this point in his career (cf. T.P. Hillman, 1994, “Authorial Statements, Narrative, and Character in Plutarch’s Agesilaus-Pompeius, esp. 258-272; G.H. Polman, 1975, “Chronological Biography and Akmê in Plutarch,” esp. 175). Plutarch states that it would have been far better had he died at this point (Pompey 46.5), for his actions after 61 BCE will become more and more harmful to Rome as Pompey falls under the sway of villains like Clodius. Still, well before this moment, Plutarch relates even Pompey’s greatest successes in a critical manner. Many of Pompey’s political and military victories, even before he is outmaneuvered and overwhelmed by Caesar, are told in a way that suggests they are not so great as the fame they bestow upon him, especially the war with Sertorius, the Servile War, and the Mithridatic War.

Plutarch does not demean or compromise every one of Pompey’s accomplishments, but he depicts many in a way that creates doubt as to whether any of his acts were great accomplishments at all. The dubious and circumspect light that Plutarch casts on Pompey’s most heralded deeds diminishes their impact and also helps to explain Pompey’s eventual defeat at the hands of Caesar.