Athens, Alexander and the Adriatic: Insurgence in the Age of Empire

Timothy Howe (St. Olaf College)

Still smarting from her defeat at Chaironeia in 338 BCE and the Common Peace imposed by Philip and his son Alexander with the so-called League of Corinth, Athens launched a local and regional insurgency the minute Alexander was occupied in Asia. But because of the impact of Alexander's achievements in Asia, Athenian insurgency has received little focused scholarly attention as a movement. For the most part, attention has been focused on the tensions between two great men--Demosthenes and Alexander (e.g. Ian Worthington, Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator, 2000 and Alexander the Great: Man and God, 2004).

This paper offers a new perspective by placing Athenian actions as a whole within the context of insurgency and resistance. Starting with the creation of a new system of military training soon after the destruction of Thebes, the Athenian demos attempted to fix the mistakes made at Chaironeia and thereby begin to resist Macedonian imperialism, by rebuilding military skill among the youth and remilitarizing Athens (IG II² 1156). This renewed military consciousness was not simply cosmetic, as Athenian leaders actually risked building a military force capable of challenging Antipater, Alexander's representative in Pella and local guarantor of the Common Peace. But this was just the beginning--Athens also focused on the back-door to Macedonia, the Adriatic, establishing colonies in the region both to gain a resource area free from Alexander's control and to put pressure on Macedonia through her allies the Epirotes and Illyrians (IG II² 1629. 128-309). At the same time, the Athenian Council of Five Hundred met in a secret session to give the general Leosthenes fifty talents and a consignment of weapons with which to oppose Macedon (Diod. 18.9.4). Leosthenes then opened negotiations with the anti-Macedonian Aitolians to create a rebel alliance. This alliance expanded quickly as Leosthenes recruited and transported at least fifty thousand mercenary soldiers across the Aegean Sea to Taenarum, a fortified base in Spartan territory, guarding the passage to the Ionian and Adriatic Seas (Diod. 17.108.7, Justin 13.5.2.). To add insult to injury, Athens even invited Persian satraps and military commanders who had survived Alexander’s purges also met them there, creating an instant center for anti-Macedonian resistance. Even old Greek heroes who had fought against Philip joined the rebel gathering at Taenarum. The geographic position of the Taenarum military base allowed for a secure defense--it was inaccessible by land which allowed Athens' strong navy to control all approaches.

This paper illustrates that towards the end of his life, Athens strategically moved against Alexander on two fronts, in the Peloponnese and the Adriatic, in a two-pronged insurgency that took full advantage of Alexander's weaknesses and his enemies, Sparta and the Aitolians. If Harpalos, Alexander's treasurer and childhood friend, had not arrived in Athens and used Alexander's gold to stir up longstanding rivalries between Athenian politicians, the Macedonians may well have lost mainland Greece. At the least Alexander would have had a serious insurgency to sort out on the doorstep of his homeland.