Macedonian Treason Cases:
the question of authority

Carol J. King (Sir Wilfred Grenfell College, Memorial University)

Many scholars have long accepted Quintus Curtius as an authority on Macedonian customs (e.g. Tarn II 1948: 106; Atkinson 1980: 368, Borza 1990: 246, Hammond 1997: 133, Worthington 2004: 124). Curtius’ references cover a wide range of customs, from using barley to mark building sites (4.8.6), to burying the dead (5.4.3), to the practice of stoning (6.11.10), to executing the relatives of those convicted of treason (8.6.28). But is Curtius, in fact, an expert on Macedonum mores? In cases of treason Curtius’ assumed expertise must come under careful scrutiny for the reason that his detailed account of a Macedonian treason trial (that of Philotas at 6.7.1 ff.) is the principal ‘evidence’ for the function and power of the Macedonian army assembly (e.g. Hammond 1992).

If one trusts Curtius, then his statement at 6.8.25 is good evidence for the respective authority of the king and the army assembly in capital cases: the king investigated cases and the army judged. This is what we see in practice in Curtius’ lengthy account of the trial of Philotas in 330, and a few years later at the trial of the Pages. Despite Curtius’ obvious rhetoric, few have questioned his trustworthiness in reporting trial procedure (the arguments of Lock CP 72, 1977: esp. 95-97 are largely overlooked in subsequent scholarship). Yet elsewhere, both through his inconsistent use of terminology (mos/ritus/lex) and in his self-contradictions Curtius fails to merit trust (at 6.11.10 and 6.11.38 stoning for treason is Macedonum more, but at 7.1.9 execution for treason is by javelins). So how authoritative is Curtius on the constitutional rights of king and army in cases of treason?

Two schools of thought on the structure of the Macedonian state hinge upon Alexander’s actions with respect to the alleged treason of Philotas and Parmenio: the “constitutionalist” position (Granier 1931, followed by many) and that of “monarchic autocracy” (Errington 1978, Lock 1977, et al., both schools summarized by Borza 1990: 232-3). Apart from Curtius’ statements, there is little evidence for a ‘constitutional’ procedure in trying cases of treason. This paper weighs the evidence for charges of treason laid during Alexander’s reign against, except in the case of Philotas, the meager evidence for formal judgment by the army assembly. Where Curtius can be checked against other sources, the evidence strongly suggests that a trial was pro facie: Alexander could, and did, act without the army’s judgment, and someone suspected of treason could be judged without appearing before either the king or a formal assembly - in fact he could be executed before any ‘official’ judgment was given. One cannot take it from Curtius’ words at 6.8.25 that the Macedonian army assembly had a constitutional right to judge in cases of treason.