Deserving Each Other: Pheres and Admetus in Euripides’ Alcestis

Kristin O. Lord (Wilfrid Laurier University)

The confrontation between Admetus and his father at Euripides’ Alcestis (614-740) is the earliest Euripidean example of the agon. Those who have observed or read this passage tend to leave the scene with a sense of revulsion toward one of the characters; indeed, it is evidence of the success of an agon for viewers to take sides. However, the parallels between father and son are as significant as their differences. Not only are both quick to anger and equally reluctant to face their own demise, they also rely on similar types of argumentation to advance their case. Pheres emphasizes the legal nature of his marriage (678 γνησίως) and the utility and obligation of parental rights and duties (e.g., 682 “I am not obligated [φείλω] to die for you” and 686 “you happen to have everything you need [χρν] from us”). Such norms are culturally determined, as we see in Pheres’ statement that expecting a parent to die for a child is “not Greek” (684 οδ’ λληνικόν). These comments are consistent with the language of Admetus’ assertion that Pheres does not respond to his need (719 χρείαν) and that, if Pheres is in pain when hearing the truth, he does not need (χρν) to wrong (ξαμαρτάνειν) his son (705).

The dispute between Pheres and Admetus illustrates a main deficiency of arguments from utility and necessity. If Admetus is to increase the personal capital given him by his father, he must expand his understandings of human relations beyond a quid pro quo. Because these arguments are connected to the broader debates in Athenian society about the relative importance of νόμος and φύσις, and the social construction of law within a given society, they suggest that Euripides’ passion for such concerns date from the very beginning of his career.

However, we should not suppose that Euripides entirely rejects arguments from necessity. Later in the play, Admetus points out that he is “not supposed to be alive” (939 γ δ’, ν ο χρν ζν, while the arrival of Heracles can be understood as the traditional embodiment of νάγκη. Instead, the play provides evidence that necessity, νόμος, and φύσις must be viewed in light of broader ethical considerations. Although the agon in Alcestis places less overt emphasis on nature than on necessity, the parallel insistence by father and son upon the primacy of νόμος ironically illustrates the limitations of their shared nature and heritage. When Pheres tells Admetus, “You have from us everything you happen to need (686 δ’ μν χρν σε τυγχάνειν εχεις),” he is right not only in the literal sense of material wealth but also —and perhaps more significantly— an innate ability to score rhetorical points at the expense of understanding another’s point of view. Ultimately, the test of whether Admetus has “changed his life to better than before” (1157) depends on achieving such understanding.

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